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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE BUSINESS
COMMUNITY: A RE-APPRAISAL IN LIGHT
OF PREVAILING PRACTICES
THE controversial Statute of Frauds, currently in effect in most American
jurisdictions, provides that agreements for the sale of goods will be enforce-
able only against a party who has signed a written memorandum of the trans-
action.' Commentators have criticized the Statute on the grounds that it does
not reflect actual practice in the business community and serves as an instru-
ment rather than a preventive of fraud, since it is invoked only to enable a
party to renege on an oral business deal which he was reasonably expected to
honor.2 It is further argued that the Statute's conclusive presumption of in-
validity serves no useful purpose, since modern fact-finding techniques will
allow the triers of fact to ascertain accurately the existence or absence of an
1. The American legislation derives from § 17 of the Statute for the Prevention of
Frauds and Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. Modified forms of this section appear in
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia as § 4 of the UNIFORM SALES ACT; in
Pennsylvania, as § 2-201 of the UNIFORM COMM CIA. CODE; and in seven states, as
separate legislation: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.02 (Supp. 1956) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-401
(Supp. 1955) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 268 (1956) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 432.020 (Supp. 1956);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 13-606, 74-201 (1955) ; OxLA. STAT. § 15-136 (Supp. 1956);
S.C. CODE § 11-103 (Supp. 1956). In New Mexico it is part of the common law. See
Childers v. Talbott, 4 N.M. 168, 16 Pac. 275 (1888). The remaining six states (Kansas,
Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia) have no specific limita-
tions on the enforceability of oral agreements for the sale of goods.
Section 17 of the original Statute of Frauds was only one of twenty-five sections which
barred enforcement of various types of oral agreements. Many American jurisdictions
have also adopted some of the other sections, and all such legislation is commonly groupLd
together under the heading of the Statute of Frauds. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 178-225 (1932). This Comment is limited in scope to a discussion of Section 17 and its
successors; thus all references to the Statute of Frauds (hereinafter sometimes called the
Statute) are only to those provisions which deal with the enforceability of oral agreements
for the sale of goods.
It should be noted that the Statute only requires a signed memorandum from the party
to be charged. See UNIFORM SALES ACT § 4(1). Thus, a party to a transaction who has
not himself signed, and whose promise is thus unenforceable, can nevertheless enforce the
signed promise of the other party. 2 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 282 (1950). In addition, the
requirement of a "signed" memorandum is not a literal one. A printed or stamped name
which reasonably identifies the promisor is sufficient. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 207(a), illustration 2 (1932). Moreover, some oral promises for the sale of goods may
be binding notwithstanding the Statute. For discussion of some of the exceptions to the
operation of the Statute, see note 9 infra; note 43 infra and accompanying text; UNIFORM
SALES ACT § 4(.)-(3); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201.
2. See, e.g., Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enactedl,
59 YALE L.J. 821, 829-34 (1950) ; Stephen & Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statuie
of Frauds, 1 L.Q. REv. 1, 5-7 (1885) ; Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachro-
nism, 3 INrD. L.J. 427, 528, 540-42 (1928) ; 13 CORNELL L.Q. 303 (1928).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
agreement.3 On the other hand, the Statute is not without defenders. They
assert that it represents contemporary business practice, which is partly a
product of the normative effect of the Statute; that the observance of written
formalities is a healthy procedure tending to eliminate uncertainty in business
transactions; and that the Statute encourages such procedure by rewarding
businessmen who insist upon adherence to the formalities.4
Although the conflicting evaluations of the Statute of Frauds are chiefly
attributable to different basic assumptions concerning business practice, writers
have made little attempt to discover what contractual practices businessmen
actually follow.0 To fill this empirical gap, the Yale Law Journal consulted
ten firms in the New Haven area and then composed a .Questionnaire which
was distributed to 200 Connecticut manufacturers.6  One hundred seventy
manufacturers were selected from eleven of the state's major industries, while
the remaining thirty were chosen from miscellaneous fields. Within each in-
dustry the firms in the sample were selected at random, except that wholly-
owned subsidiaries were excluded. 7 Eighty-seven, or forty-six per cent of the
188 still solvent and traceable businesses responded to the Questionnaire.8 In-
3. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275 (1950) ; 2 STREET, FouNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
196-97 (1906). This contention in effect challenges the present validity of the original
purpose of the Statute to prevent the successful assertion of fraudulent claims on oral
contracts proved by perjured testimony. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275 (1950); FULLER,
BASIC CONTRACT LAw 941-43 (1947) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 1308 (rev. ed. 1936).
4. See, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay int Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 740-41, 747-48 (1931) ; Lilenthal, Judicial Repeal of the Statute of Frauds, 9
HARv. L. REv. 455 (1896) ; see also authorities cited at 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275 n.1 1
(1950) ; cf. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1182 (1935).
At least one critic of the Statute concedes the possibility that it serves its original pur-
pose of preventing the assertion of fraudulent claims. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275 (1950).
5. KESSLER & SHARP, CONTRACTS 393 (1953); see also authorities cited, notes 2-4
supra; ef. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for the Control
of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 366 (1932).
6. The Questionnaire is reprinted in full in the Appendix at pages 1069-71 infra.
Although the results of the ten interviews were accorded great weight in constructing the
Questionnaire, the data presented represents solely the responses to the Questionnaire it-
self. And to prevent bias, none of the interviewees was sent a Questionnaire.
7. The sample of 200 firms was taken from the DIRECTORY OF CONNECTICUT MANU-
FACTURERS AND MECHANICAL ESTABLISHMENTS (1954), a compilation of all Connecticut
manufacturers. The number of firms selected from any one industry was roughly propor-
tionate to the total number of firms listed in that industrial category. The sample of 200
was comprised of the following types of manufacturers: primary metals (A), 10 firms;
fabricated metals (B), 20; instruments and clocks (C), 10; electrical equipment (E), 20;
furniture and fixtures (F), 10; miscellaneous manufacturing industries (I), 30; leather
goods (L), 10; machinery (M), 20; paper (P), 20; rubber (R), 20; stone, clay and glass
products (S), 10; and lumber and wood products (W), 20. The code letter following
each industrial group will be used throughout to designate a reference to that particular
industry.
8. The returned Questionnaires (hereinafter cited as QUESTIONNAIRES) are on file in
Yale Law Library.
Five firms had become insolvent and seven others were untraceable. The 87 manufac-
turers responding represent all the industries in the original sample of 200, but the per-
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formation was solicited concerning the degree of adherence to the Statute's
requirements, the attitude of the manufacturer toward the legal enforceability
of oral and written agreements, and the action which he usually takes in the
event of a failure to honor an agreement. The data collected afford fresh in-
sight into the role of the Statute of Frauds in the business world and the in-
terests which would be served or adversely affected by its repeal.
THE EXTENT OF BUSINESS COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
To determine the extent to which every-day business agreements are
rendered unenforceable 'by the Statute of Frauds, the manufacturers were
asked a series of questions designed to indicate the measure of compliance with
the Statute in dealings with both customers and suppliers. The responses re-
veal not only whether the manufacturer obtained enforceable promises in his
buying and selling practices, but also whether customers and suppliers could
enforce the manufacturer's own commitments to deliver or purchase goods.
A transaction was considered enforceable against a customer, or against the
manufacturer in his capacity as buyer, if either the initial purchase order or
a later confirmation of an oral order was in the form of a memorandum signed
by the buyer. A supplier, or the manufacturer as seller, was deemed legally
obligated to perform if his acknowledgment of the buyer's order was by signed
letter or telegram rather than by telephone or other word of mouth. If the
seller's practice was to acknowledge an order only by shipping the goods, his
conduct was not considered to fall within the scope of inquiry, since he was
deemed to have made no written or oral promise to perform prior to actual
performance and thus was not subject to an executory duty which might be
legally invalidated by the Statute of Frauds.9
centage of responses from each industrial group varies from 20% (leather goods) to 74%
(electrical equipment). The number of responses from each industry, together with the
number of solvent and traceable firms in that industry to which the Questionnaire was
sent, is as follows: Industry A, 6 of 10; B, 11/20; C, 5/8; E, 14/19; F, 3/10; I, 11/28;
L, 2/10; M, 10/20; P, 7/18; R, 8/18; S, 5/10; and W, 5/17. See note 7 supra for ex-
planation of the above code letters. Where relevant, later footnotes analyze the practices
of each industry to determine whether unequal representation of the various industries
biases the figures for the total sample.
It could be argued that the figures are biased because the very fact that a manufacturer
responds is indicative of his business practices, and thus the sampling answering the
Questionnaire is not truly random with respect to the questions asked. It is possible, for
example, that the sample is biased in favor of firms which are used to transacting business
by mail and therefore would have responded as a matter of course. See note 10 in ra;
text at note 19 infra. However, a disproportionately large number of responses might
have come from manufacturers who are dissatisfied with the lack of protection which
present law affords their oral agreements and are thus desirous of aiding any effort to
re-evaluate the worth of the Statute of Frauds. Thus, no conclusion can readily be drawn
as to the sample's bias in these respects.
9. This Comment is concerned primarily with the extent to which the Statute of
Frauds affects the enforceability of business transactions. Thus, it is necessary to exclude
[Vol. 66:10381040
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For each of the four contracting interests-customers, manufacturer as seller,
suppliers, manufacturer as buyer-every firm answering the Questionnaire
was given a numerical rating from 0 to 4. A score of 4 indicates that the party
in the stated capacity always obtains agreements which he is not barred from
enforcing by the Statute of Frauds; 3, that he usually does; 2, that he does in
roughly half of his dealings; 1, that he sometimes does but usually does not:
and 0, that he never does. The scores thus obtained were averaged for the
sample as a whole and separately for four groups of firms. Group I includes
the 22 firms with less than 25 employees; group II, 34 firms, 25-100 em-
ployees; group III, 22 firms, 101-500 employees; and group IV, 9 firms, more
than 500 employees. 10
from the analysis those dealings which would not constitute enforceable agreements even
if the Statute did not exist.
If a manufacturer responds that his practice as seller, or the practice of his suppliers,
is to acknowledge orders only by shipment of the goods, some difficulty arises in assessing
the role played by the Statute in precluding the buyer from collecting damages for the
seller's failure to deliver the goods. In most cases, the customer will have no legal remedy
for breach of contract, since, prior to shipment of the goods, the seller has not manifested
his assent to the offer to purchase goods and thus has not made a contract to which he can
be held. See RESTATE tENT, CONTRACTS §§ 20, 52 (1932). Under these circumstances, the
existence of the Statute of Frauds is irrelevant.
On the other hand, cases may arise in which the silence of a supplier of goods operates
as an acceptance of the buyer's offer and creates a contract prior to his performance. See
id. § 72, illustration 5. Under these circumstances, the Statute could be the sole cause of
the purchaser's inability to enforce the seller's unspoken commitment to deliver the goods
as requested. In addition, a few manufacturers specified that oral orders placed with them
by their customers, or placed by them with their suppliers, were acknowledged by ship-
ment only. In many of these cases, it is possible that the oral order was orally accepted
by some statement made by the seller or his agent to the party communicating the order.
Thus, in the absence of the Statute of Frauds, the buyer would be able to sue on the
executory bilateral agreement if the seller failed to perform.
If the seller does ship a part of the goods ordered, the Statute of Frauds will probably
not prevent the buyer from collecting damages for failure to deliver the remainder of the
goods. See UNnroai SALES ACT § 4(1), (3). Moreover, if the seller ships nonconform-
ing goods, the Statute will not be a bar to the buyer's action for breach of warranty. By
accepting the goods, the buyer will render the defense of the Statute inapplicable, ibid.,
and such acceptance will not preclude the buyer from successfully maintaining his breach
of warranty action, id. § 49.
In sum, where a seller designates that he accepts orders by shipment only, the Statute
of Frauds would, in the majority of cases, seem not to bar the assertion of legal rights
which would otherwise exist. Accordingly, the data given in the text excludes transactions
in which a seller acknowledges by shipment only. However, in later footnotes data is
separately computed upon the assumption that where acceptance is by shipment only, a
buyer is barred from enforcing an executory commitment because of the Statute of Frauds.
10. The distribution of the original sample of 188 firms was as follows: group I, 59;
group II, 77; group III, 37; and group IV, 15. Thus, the percentages of responses re-
ceived from each group are: I, 37%; II, 44%; III, 59%; and IV, 60%. Clearly, then, the
figures for the total sample will be influenced more by the responses of the larger manu-
facturers than if the sample responding were a true cross-section of the firms to which
the Questionnaire was sent. Therefore, all data will be presented for each size group as
well as for the total sample.
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Overall Compliance
The responses indicate that the promises of businessmen usually satisfy the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. For the sample as a whole, the com-
pliance average obtained by weighting equally the four contractual relation-
ships studied was 3.40--considerably above the 3.00 figure which indicates a
pattern of "usual" compliance with the Statute." However, the transactions
of only 8 of the 87 manufacturers with their customers and suppliers were
always characterized by the compliance of both contracting parties. 12 In addi-
tion, the different compliance averages for each of the four contractual relation-
ships, as well as for each of the four size groups of firms, disclose substantial
deviations from the overall pattern.
Compliance by Contractual Relationships
Of the contractual relationships, the highest compliance average was 3.67,
measuring the extent to which a manufacturer as buyer furnishes a supplier
with a written memorandum of the transaction. This average reflects the data
that suppliers of 70% of the manufacturers responding always obtain agree-
ments enforceable despite the Statute of Frauds, and suppliers of another 28%
usually do.13 The compliance average for the extent to which a manufacturer's
customers provide him with signed memoranda of their purchase requests was
3.13, the lowest figure for any contractual relationship. Less than half of the
11. The compliance averages for each of the contractual interests are: customers, 3.49:
manufacturer as seller, 3.13; suppliers, 3.67; and manufacturer as buyer, 3.30. See notes
13-16 infra and accompanying text. Although the sample is admittedly small, the prob-
ability is less than five in one hundred that these averages for the entire business com-
munity lie outside the following limits: customers, 3.32-3.66; manufacturer as seller, 2.90-
3.36; suppliers, 3.55-3.79; and manufacturer as buyer, 3.15-3.45. See 2 KENNEY & KEEP-
ING, MATHEMATICS OF STATISTICS 134 (2d ed. 1951).
In accordance with the method described in note 9 supra and accompanying text, the
compliance averages exclude transactions in which the manufacturer as seller, or a sup-
plier, acknowledges orders only by shipment of goods. If these transactions are included
in the analysis, the respective compliance averages for each of the above contractual in-
terests become 2.84, (3.13), (3.67), and 2.78. The overall compliance average obtained by
equally weighting these averages is 3.11, indicating that, if acceptance by shipment only
rather than by writing is considered as non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds, busi-
ness transactions still "usually" result in enforceable agreements. Since the Statute will
affect the enforceability of some transactions in which acknowledgment is "by shipment
only," see note 9 supra, the true overall compliance average of the sample responding for
the extent to which agreements are not rendered unenforceable by the Statute lies some-
where between 3.11 and 3.40.
In computing these overall compliance averages, the averages for each of the four con-
tractual interests, rather than the raw data, were used in order to prevent bias in favor
of an interest represented by a greater number of responses. However, use of the raw
data would not appreciably change the figures, as the averages for the interests of cus-
tomers and manufacturer as seller are based on 80 and 87 responses respectively, and those
for the interests of suppliers and the manufacturer as buyer, on 83 and 82 responses re-
spectively. See notes 13-16 infra.
12. These 8 manufacturers represent the following industries and size groups: R, I;
NV, I; E, II; A, III (2) ; P, III; E, IV; and P, IV. See QUESTIONNAIRES.
13. The data on which the above compliance average and percentages are based as
well as the distribution of responses and compliance averages for each industrial group
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manufacturers always enjoy such security from their customers, while another
third usually do.1 4 Thus, the responses to the Questionnaire indicate that
are given by Table I below. It can be seen that while some variation by industry exists,
the extent of compliance is consistently high for this contractual relationship. These figures
result from an analysis of the answers to questions 13 and 14 of the Questioaire. See
Appendix, page 1071 infra.
_ I. INDUSTRY*
RESPONSE A B C E F I L M P R S W Total Per
cent
(Never) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2
3 3 1 1 0 2 4 2 5 3 0 0 2 23 28
(Always) 4 3 10 3 13 1 6 0 4 4 7 4 3 58 70
Total
Responses 6 11 4 14 3 10 2 10 7 7 4 5 83 100
Compliance
Averages 3.50 3.91 3.75 3.86 3.33 3.60 3.00 3.33 3.57 4.00 4.00 3.60 3.67
* See note 7 supra.
TABLE I
Extent to which Manufacturers in Each Industry Furnish
Suppliers with Signed Memoranda of Purchase Requests
14. The data on which these figures are based are given in Table II below for the
total sample and for each industrial group. While some variation by industry appears to
exist, the compliance averages for all but one industrial group represented by more than
five manufacturers are consistently above 3.00. These figures result from an analysis of
the answers to questions 3, 4 and 5 of the Questionnaire. See Appendix page 1069 infra.
INDUSTRY*
RESPONSE A B C E F I L M P R S W Total Per
cent
(Never) 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4
1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 7 8
2 0 1 0 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 8
3 3 2 1. 4 0 3 0 2 3 5 2 4 29 33
(Always) 4 3 6 2 9 1 3 1 6 3 3 3 1 41. 47
Total
Responses 6 11 5 14 3 11 2 10 7 8 5 5 87 100
Compliance
Averages 3.50 3.09 2.20 3.56 2.00 2.73 2.50 3.20 3.14 3.38 3.60 3.20 3.13
* See note 7 supra.
TABLE II
Extent to which Manufacturers in Each Industry Receive
from Customers Signed Memoranda of Purchase Requests
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manufacturers are more likely to send signed orders to their suppliers than
their customers are to send signed orders to them. The frequency of manu-
facturers' acknowledging customers' orders in writing rather than orally pro-
duced a compliance average of 3.49, indicating that any acknowledgment is
more than "usually" written. The acknowledgments of 60%0 of the manufac-
turers are always by signed memoranda, while an additional 32% usually
acknowledge in writing.15 Oral acknowledgments of manufacturers' orders
by their suppliers are somewhat more common than oral acknowledgments
by the manufacturers of their own customers' orders. The compliance average
for a manufacturer's ability to enforce his suppliers' promises despite the
Statute of Frauds was 3.30. Only 38% of the manufacturers always obtain
15. The data on which these figures are based are given for the total sample and for
each industrial group in Table III below. The responses are highly consistent throughout
all industries. Table IV shows the comparable distribution of responses and compliance
averages when transactions in which the manufacturer acknowledges by shipment only arc
included in the analysis. The reason for the different number of responses in the two
Tables is that seven manufacturers always acknowledge orders by shipment only. See note
9 supra. The figures in both Tables are based on the answers to questions 3, 4, 9 and 10 of
the Questionnaire. See Appendix, pages 1069-70 infra.
The fact that the compliance averages in Table III are substantially higher than those
in Table IV, and the similar relationship between the averages in Table V and Table VI,
note 16 infra, indicate that sellers often acknowledge orders only by shipping the goods
requested.
INDUSTRY*
RESPONSE A B C E F I L M P R S W Total Per
cent
(Never) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 4
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 4
3 2 3 0 5 0 5 1 3 2 2 0 3 26 32
(Always) 4 3 6 4 8 2 5 1 5 4 4 4 2 48 60
Total
Responses 5 10 4 14 2 10 2 10 7 6 5 5 80 100
Compliance
Averages 3.60 3.40 4.00 3.50 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.20 3.43 3.67 3.40 3.40 3.49
* See note 7 supra.
TABLE III
Extent to which Manufacturers in Each Industry Furnish
Customers with Signed rather than Oral Acknowledgments
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written rather than oral acknowledgments from their suppliers; 57% usually
do.16
INDUSTRY*
RESPONSE A B C E F I L M P R S W Total Per
cent
(Never) 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 7
1 0 4 0 2 1. 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 11 13
2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 10 11
3 3 3 2 3 0 4 0 3 3 2 0 1 24 28
(Always) 4 2 4 2 7 1 4 1 3 3 4 3 2 36 41
Total
Responses 6 11. 5 14 3 11 2 10 7 8 5 5 87 100
Compliance
Averages 2.83 2.64 2.80 3.07 1.67 2.73 3.00 2.80 3.29 2.75 3.00 3.00 2.84
See note 7 supra.
TABLE IV
Extent to which Manufacturers in Each Industry Furnish
Customers with Signed Acknowledgments rather than Oral
Acknowledgments or Acknowledgments by Shipment Only
16. The data on which these figures are based are given for the total sample and for
each industrial group in Table V below. Only slight variation by industry exists. Table
VI shows the comparable distribution of responses and compliance averages when trans-
actions in which the supplier acknowledges by shipment only are included in the analysis.
See note 9 supra. The figures in both Tables are based on the answers to questions 15 and
16 of the Questionnaire. See Appendix, page 1071 infra. For explanation of the dif-
ferent number of responses and the different compliance averages in the two Tables, see
note 15 supra.
INDUSTRY*
RESPONSE A B C E F I L M P R S W Total Per
cent(Never) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 4
" 3 .. ..4 8 " 2 10 2 3 1 7 1. 4 4 1 47 57
(Always) 4 2 3 1 4 0 6 1 1 6 4 0 3 31 38
Total
Responses 6 11 4 14 2 9 2 10 7 8 5 4 82 100
Compliance
Averages 3.33 3.27 3.00 3.29 3.00 3.67 3.50 2.70 3.86 3.50 2.80 3.75 3.30
* See note 7 supra.
TABLE V
Extent to which Manufacturers in Each Industry Receive
from Suppliers Signed rather than Oral Acknowledgments
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On the basis of the preceding data, it may be concluded that the Statute of
Frauds bars enforcement of promises made to manufacturers more often than
promises made by them. It may also be noted that the Statute affects buyers
as a class and sellers as a class about equally, the overall compliance average
for each of these two groups being 3.40.17 In addition, the incidence of oral
agreements in the transactions between a manufacturer and his customers is
slightly higher than in dealings between a manufacturer and his suppliers, as
shown by the overall compliance averages of 3.31 and 3.49 for the two respec-
tive contractual areas.13
Compliance by Size Group
The responses also reveal what appears to be a direct relationship between
the size of a manufacturing firm and the likelihood that the manufacturer and
INDUSTRY*
RESPONSE A B C E F I L M P R S V Total Per
cent
(Never) 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 4
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2
2 0 2 1 2 0 2 0 3 0 1 1 1 13 15
3 6 7 3 10 2 6 2 6 5 5 4 2 58 69
(Always) 4 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 8 10
Total
Responses 6 11 5 14 3 9 2 10 7 8 5 4 84 100
Compliance
Averages 3.00 3.00 2.20 3.00 2.00 2.89 3.00 2.40 3.29 2.75 2.80 2.25 2.78
* See note 7 supra.
TABLE VI
Extent to which Manufacturers in Each Industry Receive
from Suppliers Signed Acknowledgments rather than Oral
Acknowledgments or Acknowledgments by Shipment Only
17. The compliance average for buyers as a class is simply the arithmetical mean of
the compliance averages for the manufacturer's ability to enforce the promises of his
supplier (3.30) and the customer's ability to enforce those of the manufacturer (3.49).
Similarly, the figure for sellers as a class is the mean of the compliance averages for the
manufacturer's ability to enforce the orders of his customers (3.13) and the supplier's
ability to enforce those of the manufacturer (3.67). See notes 13-16 supra and accom-
panying text.
18. The overall compliance average for each of the two contractual areas is the mean
of the compliance averages for the two contractual interests which comprise the area.
Thus, the 3.31 figure is the mean of the compliance averages for the customer's ability to
enforce the promises of the manufacturer (3.49) and the manufacturer's ability to enforce
those of his customer (3.13). See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
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the parties with whom he deals comply with the Statute. The overall com-
pliance average for group I was 3.07; for group II, 3.37; for group III, 3.65;
and for group IV, 3.69.19 This correlation between size and compliance is
most evident in the figures indicating whether a manufacturer obtains signed
agreements from his customers. The compliance averages for this contractual
relationship were group I, 2.73; group II, 2.97; group III, 3.50; and group
IV, 3.78. The fact that a large manufacturer is more likely than a small
manufacturer to have a contract enforceable against his customers is further
illustrated by the finding that the customers of only 27% of the firms in group
I always send signed orders, while the customers of 78% of the group IV firms
always do. The comparable figures for groups II and III are 41% and 64%
respectively. 20
A noteworthy, though less striking, correlation exists between the size of
the manufacturer and the probability that he will arm his customer with an
enforceable rather than oral acknowledgment. The compliance average in this
area for group I was 2.95, and the promises of only 20% of the firms in this
group are always enforceable by their customers. The comparable figures for
the other three groups were: group II, 3.53 and 63%; group III, 3.81 and
19. The overall compliance averages are computed by taking the mean of the com-
pliance averages for all contractual interests. See note 11 supra. For the data on which
these compliance averages are based, see notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
20. The distribution of all responses in this area for each size group of manufacturers
is presented in Table VII below. For this contractual relationship, the probability that the
difference between the average of groups I and II combined (2.87) and that of groups
III and IV combined (3.58) occurred by chance is less than one in four hundred. See 2
IKENImY & KEEPING, op. cit. supra note 11, at 160, 162, 178.
SizE GaouP*
RESPONSE I II III IV Total
(Never) 0 2 1 0 0 3
1 2 4 1 0 7
2 2 4 1 0 7
3 10 11 6 2 29
(Always) 4 6 14 14 7 41
Total
Responses 22 34 22 9 87
Compliance
Averages 2.73 2.97 3.50 3.78 3.13
* See text at note 10 supra.
T m VII
Extent to which Different Size Manufacturers Receive
from Customers Signed Memoranda of Purchase Requests
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81%; and group IV, 3.78 and 89%.21 The ability of a manufacturer to hold
his suppliers through the receipt of signed acknowledgments varies directly
with the size of the manufacturer, though for this contractual relationship as
well as the preceding one the compliance averages for groups III and IV were
essentially the same. The figures for each of the four size groups were: I,
3.11: II, 3.31; III, 3.41; and IV, 3.44. Suppliers' acknowledgments are
always enforceable by the following percentages of manufacturers: group I,
21. The distribution of all responses in this area for each size group of manufacturers
is presented in Table VIII below. The probability that the differences apparent in this
Table between the averages of groups I and II combined (3.30) and that of groups III
and IV combined (3.80) occurred by chance is less than one in two hundred fifty. Ibid.
Table IX shows the comparable distribution of responses and compliance averages when
transactions in which the manufacturer acknowledges by shipment only are included in
the analysis. See note 9 supra.
SIZE GRouP*
RESPONSE I II III IV Total
(Never) 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 1 0 0 3
2 1 1 0 1 3
3 13 9 4 0 26
(Always) 4 4 19 17 8 48
Total
Responses 20 30 21 9 80
Compliance
Averages 2.95 3.53 3.81 3.78 3.49
* See text at note 10 supra.
TABLE VIII
Extent to which Different Size Manu-
facturers Furnish Customers with Signed
rather than Oral Acknowleduments
SIZE GROUP*
RESPONSE I II III IV Total
(Never) 0 2 4 0 0 6
1 4 3 3 1 11
2 2 7 0 1 10
3 10 7 5 2 24
(Always) 4 4 13 14 5 36
Total
Responses 22 34 22 9 87
Compliance
Averages 2.45 2.65 3.36 3.22 2.84
* See text at note 10 supra.
TABLE IX
Extent to which Different Size Manu-
facturers Furnish Customers with
Signed Acknowledgments rather than
Oral Acknowledgments or Acknowledg-
ments by Shipment Only
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42% ; group II, 31%; group III, 41%; and group IV, 44%.22 The extent to
which a supplier can enforce the obligations of a manufacturing firm with
whom he does business also varies with the size of the manufacturer, but since
the compliance average of each size group for this relationship is extremely
high, the differences according to manufacturer's size are of limited signifi-
cance. The compliance averages and the percentages of the manufacturers
22. Table X below gives the distribution of all responses in this area by the size of the
manufacturer responding. Table XI presents the comparable distribution of responses and
compliance averages when transactions in which the supplier acknowledges by shipment
only are included in the analysis. See note 9 supra. For discussion of the significance of
the different compliance averages in Tables X and XI, as well as of the differences in
responses in Tables VIII and IX, note 21 supra, see note 15 supra.
SIZE GROUP*
RESPONSE I II III IV Total
(Never) 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 3 0 0 0 3
3 7 22 13 5 47
(Always) 4 8 10 9 4 31
Total
Responses 19 32 22 9 82
Compliance
Averages 3.11 3.31 3.41 3.44 3.30
* See text at note 10 stpra.
TABLE X
Extent to which Different Size Manu-
facturers Receive from Suppliers Signed
rather than Oral Acknowledgments
SIZE GROUP*
RESPONSE I II III IV Total
(Never) 0 2 1 0 0 3
1 1 1 0 0 2
2 7 1 5 0 13
3 8 27 17 6 58
(Always) 4 2 3 0 3 8
Total
Responses 20 33 22 9 84
Compliance
Averages 2.35 2.91 2.77 3.33 2.78
* See text at note 10 supra.
TABLE XI
Extent to which Different Size Manu-
facturers Receive from Suppliers Signed
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whose suppliers always obtain a signed statement of the purchase were I, 3.50,
50%; II, 3.66, 69%; III, 3.86, 86%; and IV, 3.75, 88%.23
Thus, the compliance averages for all four contractual relationships indicate
that the practice of tendering and receiving oral promises varies substantially
with the size of the manufacturer, except that only inconclusive differences
exist between the averages of firms with 100-500 employees and those with
over 500 employees. 24 However, since in all relationships the percentages of
"always complying" responses were highest for the latter group of firms, 25 a
larger sample might well disclose a perfect correlation between the size of the
manufacturer and the frequency of compliance with the Statute by the manu-
facturer and the parties with whom he deals.
Conclusion
The foregoing tabulations disclose that while contractual dealings of busi-
nessmen generally meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, a limited
number of agreements are rendered legally unenforceable by the Statute. This
conclusion is especially true in the area of a small manufacturer's transactions
with his customers. For firms with no more than twenty-five employees, the
compliance averages for both the customer's ability to enforce the manufac-
turer's commitments and the manufacturer's ability to hold his customer were
23. The distribution of all responses bearing on this contractual interest is given by
the size of the manufacturer responding in Table XII below.
Size GRoup*
REsPoNsE I II III IV Total
(Never) 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 1 2
3 11 9 3 0 23
(Always) 4 11 22 18 7 58
Total
Responses 22 32 21 8 83
Compliance
Averages 3.50 3.66 3.86 3.75 3.67
* See text at note 10 mipra.
TABLE XII
Extent to which Different Size Manufacturers Furnish
Suppliers with Signed Memoranda of Purchase Requests




less than 3.00,20 indicating a pattern of less than "usual" compliance with the
Statute. The same pattern emerges for the ability of the slightly larger manu-
facturer-one with 25 to 100 employees-to enforce orders of his cus-
tomers2 7 With these three exceptions, all compliance averages for each size
group in each contractual relationship were well above the 3.00 dividing line,
thus signifying that a relatively small number of promises in ordinary business
dealings are not legally binding because of the Statute of Frauds. The dis-
covery that oral promises are more prevalent in the transactions of small
manufacturers than in the dealings of large ones is not surprising. As shown
by the responses, the reduction to writing of all commitments-both of the
manufacturer and of the parties with whom he deals-is an important factor
in the efficient operation of the modern large-scale business organization. A
small manufacturer, handling a more limited volume of business on a more
personal basis, is likely to find strict adherence to business formalities both
more foreign to the nature of his business relationships and less necessary in
the interest of efficiency.28
THE EXTENT TO VHICH WRITTEN DOCUMENTS ARE REQUESTED
In addition to indicating how frequently business agreements in fact comply
with the Statute of Frauds, the responses to the Questionnaire also revealed
to what extent manufacturers actually request documents signed by the other
contracting party, in contrast to voluntary tender of such documents by the
promisor. Thus, the manufacturers disclosed whether they require written
rather than oral acknowledgment of an order placed with a supplier, or writ-
ten confirmation of an oral order received from a customer.29 These responses
were thought crucial in determining whether businessmen feel the need to
possess the documents required by the Statute as a condition of enforcing their
promisors' agreements. The overall compliance average for the likelihood that
a manufacturer, given an oral acknowledgment of an order placed with a sup-
plier, would still insist upon a written one was only 1.61, indicating that a
manufacturer would require such written acknowledgment less than half of
the time. The compliance averages for this question again varied directly with
the size of the manufacturer, as shown by the following scores: size group I,
1.25; II, 1.45; III, 1.64; and IV, 2.89. Only eight of the 84 manufacturers
responding would always require that a written acknowledgment follow an
26. See notes 20, 21 supra and accompanying text.
27. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
28. The comment of one medium-size manufacturer (200 employees) may well describe
prevailing business practices: "When dealing with large corporations everything must be
spelled out, confirmed, etc. When dealing with small companies, or where dealing direct
with top management, a much more informal basis is established." QUESTIONNAIRES.
29. See questions 5 and 16 of the Questionnaire, Appendix, pages 1069, 1071 infra.
1957] 1051
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
oral one; two were in group 1 (10% of the group) ; three in group II (10%),
and three in group IV (33%). 3o
In contrast to these exceedingly low scores, the overall compliance average
for the extent to which a manufacturer will request a written confirmation of
a customer's oral order was 2.76. Forty-one of 87 manufacturers always re-
quire such confirmation. The differences in this area for the various size groups
of firms were also striking, and clearly indicated that the larger the manufac-
turer, the greater the likelihood that his practice is to require confirmation.
The compliance average for group I was 2.18, indicating that firms with less
than 25 employees request written confirmation of oral orders slightly more
often than they do not. For group II, the figure was 2.56, while for groups
III and IV, it rose to 3.32 and 3.56 respectively. The percentages of each size
group which always requested confirmation were group I, 27%; group II,
30. The distribution of all responses to this question, as well as the compliance aver-
ages, are given for the total sample and by the size of the manufacturer in Table XIII
below. The probability that the differences apparent in this Table between the averages
of groups I and II combined (1.38) and that of groups III and IV combined (2.00)
occurred by chance is less than three in one hundred. See 2 KENNEY & KEEPING, op. Cit.
supra note 11, at 160-62, 178.
SIZE GRouP*
RESPONSE I II III IV Total Per cent
(Never) 0 5 6 0 0 11 13
1. 11 18 15 2 46 55
3 2 6 7 4 19 23
(Always) 4 2 3 0 3 8 9
Total
Responses 20 33 22 9 84 100
Compliance
Averages 1.18 1.45 1.64 2.89 1.61
* See text at note 10 supra.
TABLE XIII
Extent to which Different Size Manufacturers Request from
Their Suppliers Written Confirmation of Oral Acknowledgments
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41%; group III, 64%; and group IV, 78%'.31 Thus, all the figures for this
question-both compliance averages for each size group and the percentages
responding "always"--vere much higher ,than the comparable figures for the
question whether written acknowledgment following a supplier's oral acknowl-
edgment is required.3 2
Still, it is doubtful whether this data necessarily leads to the conclusion that
businessmen are more anxious to have legally binding commitments from their
31. Table XIV below gives the distribution of all responses to this question for the
total sample and by the size of the manufacturer. The probability that the differences
apparent in this Table between the averages of groups I and II combined (2.41) and that
of groups III and IV combined (3.39) occurred by chance is less than one in four hun-
dred. Ibid.
SIzE Gaoup*
REsPONsE I II III IV Total Per cent
(Never) 0 4 5 1 0 10 12
1 6 7 2 1 16 18
3 6 8 5 1 20 23
(Always) 4 6 14 14 7 41 47
Total
Responses 22 34 22 9 87 100
Compliance
Averages 2.18 2.56 3.32 3.56 2.76
See text at note 10 supra.
TABLE XIV
Extent to which Different Size Manufacturers Request
from Their Customers Written Confirmation of Oral Orders
32. The marked difference between the incidence of manufacturers' requests for writ-
ten documents from (a) suppliers and (b) customers does not eliminate the possibility of
consistency in the practice followed by any given manufacturer when faced with an oral
commitment from either type of promisor. This would be so if, e.g., manufacturers who
always request written confirmation from customers usually request such documents from
suppliers, and manufacturers who sometimes request written confirmation from customers
never make such a request to suppliers. If such a consistent pattern exists, it could be
argued that businessmen seek some general level of legal security in all their dealings,
even though this level varies to some extent with the nature of the transaction. However,
the relevant statistical measure shows only a minimal relationship between the two sets
of data. The coefficient of correlation was +.20 for the total sample and +.09, +.18, +.26,
and -. 47 for groups I (20 firms), II (33 firms), III (22 firms), and IV (9 firms)
respectively. See id. at 69. None of these figures is significantly different from a zero
score which would indicate that no correlation exists between the practice of requesting
written documents from suppliers and that of requesting them from customers. See id. at
215.
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customers than from their suppliers. Even if the manufacturer feels an equal
need to exact enforceable promises from both classes of parties with whom he
deals, he might be more prone to require written confirmations in dealings
with his customers because of factors which do not come into play in trans-
actions with suppliers. When a manufacturer receives an order from a cus-
tomer, it is the manufacturer himself who must take the initial action by filling
the order. By requesting a written confirmation of an oral order, he not only
obtains an enforceable agreement against the customer, but also makes certain
that he has properly recorded the specifications of the order and can present
his customer with documentary proof that the goods delivered are as requested.
In contrast, when a manufacturer places an order with a supplier, the latter
is the party who must initiate the action and fulfill the demands of his buyer.
Since the manufacturer merely awaits performance, he does not need written
documents as an aid in conforming his own action to another's specifications. 33
The thirty-six manufacturers who either usually or sometimes, but not
always, request written confirmation of an oral purchase order 34 were also
asked the circumstances under which they would make such a demand.35 The
criteria most frequently mentioned for distinguishing among customers in this
respect were whether or not the customer submitting an oral order was known
to the manufacturer, and whether or not the manufacturer lacked confidence
in the customer's integrity.36 These factors may help to explain the greater
tendency of the larger firms to request written follow-ups of the oral promises
of both customers and suppliers. While the large manufacturer, immersed in
business formality, finds it impractical to follow a flexible pattern of conduct
in his dealings, the smaller businessman is more likely to have personal knowl-
edge of his promisors which he can utilize as a basis for varying his practices.
However, the relatively infrequent demand of the small businessman for writ-
33. It might appear that once the manufacturer has received his supplier's oral
acknowledgment, the only additional reason for requesting a written acknowledgment
would be to provide the manufacturer with a legal weapon in the event of non-performance.
If this reasoning were valid, the compliance averages for requests for written acknowledg-
ments from suppliers could be taken as a measure of the manufacturer's desire for legal
security in all transactions, and only the increase in compliance averages for requests for
written confirmation from customers could be ascribed to the non-legal reasons outlined
in text. However, other data obtained strongly indicate that the reasons for requesting
written documents from suppliers are also non-legal. See notes 63, 65 infra and accom-
panying text.
34. See Table XIV, note 31 supra.
35. See question 5 of the Questionnaire in Appendix, page 1069 infra.
36. Of these 36 manufacturers, 24 specified their reasons for making a distinction, 4
naming two criteria: 14 would require written confirmation if the customer was not
known; 8, if confidence in the customer's integrity was lacking; 3, if the size of the order
was unusually large; 2, if the customer used the written purchase order form himself;
and 1, if the order was for special goods. See QUESTIONNAES.
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ten follow-ups may also be an incident of his comparatively weak bargaining
position, which may preclude him from freely demanding written documents
from his promisors even though he would desire such documents for his own
legal security.37
THE EXTENT OF RELIANCE UPON ORAL PROMISES
Besides ascertaining the extent to which businessmen receive and request
signed documents from their customers, the Questionnaire also sought to deter-
mine to what extent manufacturers deem the receipt of such documents to be
prerequisite to their own performance. Of the 77 manufacturers in the sample
who always, usually, or sometimes request written confirmation of their cus-
tomers' oral orders, 38 only 12 make it a rule never to commence production
prior to receiving such confirmation. 3 9 Of the remaining 65 manufacturers
who are willing to rely upon an initial oral order at least part of the time, 55
would do so when doing business with a customer with whom they have had
only occasional prior dealings; and 33. even when doing business with a cus-
tomer with whom they have had no prior dealings. But 23 of the manufac-
turers said that they would never act without written confirmation if the buyer
did not express an urgent need for the goods, thus indicating that they prefer
to wait until confirmation under normal circumstances but may make an ex-
ception if rapid commencement of production is a business necessity from the
customer's viewpoint. Moreover, all but 12 of the 65 manufacturers said that
they would not commence production for a customer with a poor credit rating
prior to receipt of a written order. 40 The findings also revealed that most of
the 77 manufacturers who ever request written confirmation of oral orders
will, when forced to revise an order because of inability to fill it as received,
37. But see text at note 63 infra.
33. See Table XIV, note 31 suepra. The fact that a manufacturer who never requests
written confirmation from his customers would commence production prior to the receipt
of an expected written confirmation was felt to be insignificant Thus, the responses of
these 10 manufacturers were excluded from the analysis.
39. This information is based on the responses to question 6 of the Questionnaire.
See Appendix, page 1069 infra. As expected, most (10) of these 12 manufacturers were
firms which always request written confirmation of their customers' oral orders. It should
be noted, however, that every other manufacturer in this latter group of 41 would com-
mence production prior to receipt of an enforceable document from their customer. See
Table XIV, note 31 supra.
40. The foregoing data are based on the answers to question 7 of the Questionnaire.
See Appendix, page 1070 infra. Table XV below shows the distribution of all responses
to this question. A fact not revealed by the Table is that 29 of the 65 firms (45%) are
less likely to rely on the oral orders of new than occasional customers. See QuEsTiON-
, AnREs. The figures in the Table demonstrate that reliance on the oral promises of any of
the four classes of customers is not the "usual" practice of businessmen. The remarks of
one medium-sized (25-100 employees) machinery manufacturer addressed to the issue of
reliance explain the results found in Table XV and in text at note 39 supra: "[T]he
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commence work before the customer accepts the revision in writing.41 Only
15 of these manufacturers never begin production upon the basis of an oral
acceptance of such a change in the original sales agreement, while 44 are
always or usually willing to do so.42
ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS REFLECTED IN PRACTICE?
The foregoing data reveal that whether a manufacturer will rely upon his
customer's oral order is dependent upon certain practical considerations, such
as the extent to which he has previously done business with the customer, the
customer's financial condition, and the urgency of the need for the goods. While
the Statute of Frauds makes no exceptions on the basis of any of these criteria,
it does specify circumstances under which a manufacturer could rely upon an
oral order and still have legally recognizable rights against the customer. The
Statute will not operate as a bar to enforcement if the agreement is for goods
made specially to the purchaser's order, or if the value of the goods is less than
a certain amount, usually $500.43
ideal situation is, for reasons of cost and time, to be able to accomplish as much as can be
done orally without a high probability of error being introduced." QUESTIONNAIRE.
RESPONSE
NATURE OF CUSTOMER Always Usually Sometimes Never
One with whom the manufacturer
has had only occasional dealings 7 13 35 10
One with whom the manufacturer
has had no prior dealings 3 7 23 32
One whose credit rating is poor 1 1 10 53
One who does not express an
urgent need for the goods 1 8 33 23
TABLE XV
Extent to which Manufacturers will Commence Production prior
to Receiving Written Confirmation of Oral Orders from Various
Classes of Customers
41. The Statute of Frauds imposes the same requirements for enforceability of the
revised agreement as it did for the original one. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 223
(1932).
42. These figures are based on the answers to 'luestion 11 of the Questionnaire. See
Appendix, page 1070 infra. The distribution of all responses indicating the extent to
which manufacturers rely on oral acceptances of their revisions is as follows: Always, 7;
Usually, 37; About one-half the time, 4; Sometimes, 14; and Never, 15. See QUESTION-
NAIRES.
43. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 4(1), (2). The rationale given for the exclusion of con-
tracts for goods made to the buyer's order is that such agreements are more akin to em-
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Special Goods v. Stock Items
To test whether these statutory exceptions are reflected in practice, the
manufacturers were first asked whether their willingness to rely upon oral
orders would be greater if special goods were ordered by the buyer.44 Of the
65 firms who at least part of the time require written confirmation of oral
orders, but who are sometimes willing to commence production before receiv-
ing confirmation, 15% said that they are more likely to start production on
an oral order for special goods than on one for stock items; 43% answered
that they are less likely to rely upon an oral order for special goods; and 29%
indicated that they make no distinction in this respect between special goods
and stock items.45 Thus, the practice of over two-fifths of this group is direct-
ly contrary to that contemplated by the Statute, while less than one-fifth in-
dicated that the statutory exception reflects business practice.
Amounit of the Order
Moreover, the same 65 firms were asked whether their willingness to rely
on an oral order depends upon the value of the goods requested and, if so, the
amount at which they make a distinction.4 6 Sixty-eight per cent of these firms
indicated that their reliance policy is in no way related to the amount of the
order; another 6% answered that the larger the amount the more likely they
are to act upon an oral order. Eighteen per cent of the firms disclosed that
they make a distinction in their readiness to act on oral orders at $500 or
ployment contracts than to contracts for the sale of goods. See Indiana Limestone Co. v.
Harry Bernstein Cut Stone Co., 263 App. Div. 312, 32 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1st Dep't 1942).
For discussion of a more practical justification for different treatment of this class of
contracts, see text at notes 83-84 in!ra.
The minimum dollar value above which the Statute becomes operative varies from
$2500, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1315.05 (Page Supp. 1956), to $30, AR. STAT. ANN.
§ 68-1404 (Supp. 1955) ; Mo. REV. STAT. § 432.020 (Supp. 1956). Two states make no
distinction by value. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.02 (Supp. 1956); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 554.4 (Supp. 1956). The dollar amounts at which the distinction is most frequently made
are $500 and $50.
44. See question 8 of the Questionnaire in Appendix, page 1070 infra.
45. See text at notes 38-39 supra for the source of the sample of 65. The percentages
in text represent respectively 10, 28, and 19 firms responding. In addition, 6 firms (9%)
stated that they manufactured either only stock items or only special goods, and 2 manu-
facturers (3%) did not respond to the question. The remaining 1% is attributable to
fractions. See QUESTIONNAIRES.
46. The data in this paragraph are based on the answers to the last sub-question in
question 7 of the Questionnaire. See Appendix, page 1070 infra. If a manufacturer
distinguished only between orders under $500 and orders of a greater amount, he was
considered to make a distinction at $500 or under. Similarly, if he distinguished only be-
tween orders from $500 to $2500 and orders over $2500, he was said to make a distinction
at some figure over $500. The two manufacturers who distinguished among all three
classes of orders were placed in the former category in order to maximize the possibility
that the statutory distinction is followed in practice. See note 49 infra and accompanying
text.
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under; and 8%, at some figure over $500. 4 7 Since, with one exception,48 the
dollar value below which the Statute of Frauds is inoperative never exceeds
$500, it is clear that the practice of no more than 18% of the firms mirrors
this statutory distinction.49 Thus, the circumstances under which a business-
man will rely upon an oral order bear little resemblance to the classes of oral
promises excepted from the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE MANUFACTURERS TOWARD THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Despite the fact that the manufacturers responding sometimes obtain
promises from their customers and suppliers which the Statute of Frauds
renders unenforceable, the manufacturers as a group do not favor an extension
of the legal protection presently afforded their agreements. ° One per cent of
the manufacturers believe that the law should not enforce any day-to-day busi-
ness agreements; another 38% would prefer that a transaction be legally en-
forceable only when both parties have signed documents relating to an order;
an additional 14% believe that the law should enforce precisely those agree-
ments which are presently binding under the Statute, i.e., where both parties
or the party being sued have signed memoranda of the transaction. Thus, over
half of the manufacturers believe that the law should honor no more agree-
ments than are presently upheld by the Statute of Frauds, while almost two-
fifths of the manufacturers would favor a change in the law making fewer
agreements enforceable.' In contrast, less than a third of the manufacturers
47. See note 46 supra. Of the 65 firms, 44 indicated they make no distinction by the
amount of the order. The remaining percentages in text represent respectively 4, 12 and
5 manufacturers. The explanation for the 4 firms who answered that they were more
likely to act upon the receipt of a large oral order than a small one may be that the
former is more apt to come from larger, and perhaps more valuable, customers.
One small (less than 25 employees) manufacturer of rubber goods bluntly compared
this basis for making a distinction with that of knowledge of the customer as follows:
"The distinction is made on who the customer is, on relations in the past, etc.; not on the
amount of the order." QuEsnoxNAIIE.
48. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1315.05 (Page Supp. 1956) ($2500 lower limit);
UNIFOam SALES ACT § 4 (statutory notes) ; see also note 43 supra.
49. The exact percentage is impossible to determine, for the relevant Statute of Frauds
may depend upon where one of the Connecticut manufacturers obtains jurisdiction over a
defaulting customer. Some states hold the Statute to be substantive. See, e.g., Smith v.
Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 120 F. Supp. 674, 681-82 (D. Del. 1954), vacated on other
grounds, 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955). If suit were brought in such a jurisdiction, the
critical amount would probably be not $500 but the $100 figure found in the Connecticut
Statute of Frauds, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8294 (Supp. 1955). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS
§ 334, comment b (1934). On the other hand, those jurisdictions which characterize the
Statute as procedural would apply the lex fori. See, e.g., Porter v. Reid, 79 F. Supp. 898
(D. Mass. 1948) ; Fimian v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 209 Ga. 113, 70 S.E.2d 762 (1952).
50. The data in this paragraph are based on the responses to question 17 of the
Questionnaire. See Appendix, page 1071 infra.
51. See note 1 supra and accompanying text for the agreements presently upheld by
the Statute of Frauds.
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would prefer to have more agreements enforceable than are honored under exist-
ing law: 187 would favor the extension of legal protection to a party who had
performed in reliance upon an oral order,52 and 12%o would have all agree-
ments enforceable, even in the absence of signed documents or part perform-
ance. The remaining 17% of the manufacturers would have the law honor
some presently unenforceable agreements, but would at the same time with-
draw existing legal protection surrounding other classes of promises. Thus,
3% of the manufacturers would enforce an agreement only if the suing party,
relying upon either a written or oral promise, had already performed, and
14% would enforce only such an agreement and one marked by the signed
documents of both contracting parties. 3 The only kind of agreement which a
majority of the manufacturers believes should be enforced, then, is one where
both parties have signed documents relating to the transaction, 96% favoring
the legal recognition of such an agreement.5 4
52. It should be noted that the equitable doctrine of part performance applies ex-
clusively to oral agreements for the sale of an interest in land. Ackerman-Beardsley-Ben-
net, Inc. v. Baker, 19 Conn. Supp. 205, 111 A.2d 17 (C.P. 1954); 2 WILLIsTox, Cox-
TRACTS § 533 (rev. ed. 1936); compare RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 1.97 (1932), with
UNiFoRM SALES ACT § 4(1), (3).
53. Eighty-one manufacturers responded to this question. The percentages in text at
notes 51-53 supra, represent respectively the following numbers of manufacturers: 1, 31,
11, 15, 10 and 13 (2 and 11).
Table XVI below shows the responses to this question by the size of the manufacturer
answering. The meaningful figures are fairly consistent for the four size groups, except
that the smallest manufacturers (group I) appear to favor the most restrictive role of the
law.
SIZE GRouP
REsPoNsE I II III IV Total
Desire Fewer Agree-
ments Enforceable 11 12 5 4 32
Desire More Agree-
ments Enforceable 4 11 7 3 25
Desire the same Agree-
ments Enforceable 2 3 4 2 11
Indeterminate* 2 6 5 0 13
Total Responses 19 32 21 9 81
* See text at notes 52-53 ,supra.
TABLE: XVI
Agreements Desired Enforceable by Different
Size Manufacturers in Relation to Those
Presently Binding under the Statute of Frauds
54. This percentage represents 78 of the 81 manufacturers responding. The legal
enforceability of two other classes of agreements received almost majority approval: 47%
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The Influence of the Nature of the Promises Received
The reluctance of the manufacturers as a group to extend the present scope
of legal protection afforded business agreements is especially significant, since
most of the manufacturers who indicated that they do not favor such an exten-
sion obtain promises from their customers or suppliers which are not enforce-
able under existing law. Of the. 43 manufacturers who feel that the law should
never enforce an oral promise, 34 at least part of the time receive oral promises
unconfirmed in writing in the course of their buying or selling practices. 5
Thus, these manufacturers favor a law which presently affords them no legal
recourse against a supplier who does not deliver goods after orally acknowl-
edging an order,56 or against a customer who refuses to accept goods delivered
by the manufacturer in reliance upon an oral order.5 7 Of the 28 manufacturers
who would enforce an oral order, but only if accompanied by the promisee's
performance, 27 at least part of the time receive oral promises unconfirmed in
writing from their suppliers or customers. s Accordingly, these manufacturers
do not believe that the oral promises of the parties with whom they deal
should be enforced, except in those instances where they have commenced
production in reliance upon a customer's oral order, or have paid a supplier
in advance of delivery.
Moreover, 17 manufacturers would restrict the scope of the law in such a
way that some of the presently binding promises of their customers would no
longer be enforceable. Fifteen of the manufacturers who desire legal enforce-
ability of agreements signed by both parties, but not of those signed only by
the party to be charged, at least part of the time do not supply their customers
with written acknowledgments of written orders.5 9 Eleven of these 15 manu-
facturers would enforce a written order only if followed by a written acknowl-
edgment, while the remaining four would also enforce a written order not
acknowledged in writing if the seller had performed in reliance. Thus, the
former group would deny themselves the right which they presently enjoy to
sue a customer upon any written order acknowledged orally or by shipment."
The latter group believes that the law is erroneous in granting their present
right to collect damages for the cancellation of a written order acknowledged
(38) of the 81 manufacturers would enforce a promise, oral or written, if the suing party
had performed; 44% (36 firms) would enforce an agreement against a party who had
signed a memorandum relating to the transaction even if the suing party had not. How-
ever, only 12% (10) of the manufacturers responding would have all agreements enforce-
able. See text at notes 50-53 supra.
55. These data are based on a cross-analysis of the responses to question 17, see note 53
supra and accompanying text, and questions 3, 4, 5, 15 and 16 of the Questionnaire. See
Appendix, pages 1069, 1071 infra.
56. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Stone, 243 Iowa 904, 54 N.W.2d 454 (1952).
57. See, e.g., Marilyn Shoe Co. v. Martin's Shoe Store, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 18 (Ky.
1952).
58. See note 55 supra.
59. The data in this paragraph are based on a crosS-analysis of the responses to ques-
tions 10 and 17 of the Questionnaire. See Appendix, pages 1070-71 infra.
60. See notes 1, 9 supra and accompanying text.
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orally but not yet resulting in performance.6 In addition to these 15 manu-
facturers, the two manufacturers who would only enforce a promise if the
promisee had already performed often receive and acknowledge written orders
which under existing law would be binding on the customer prior to the manu-
facturer's performance.
The Influence of the Practice Followed After Breach
The unwillingness of manufacturers to have the law enforce oral promises
and even some of the written promises which are presently binding indicates
that they favor restricted intervention of the law into the field of ordinary
business dealings. This laissez faire attitude toward legal sanctions is ex-
plained by the action which manufacturers take in the event that a customer
reneges on his commitments.6 2 Only 10% of the manufacturers responding to
the Questionnaire ever make it their practice to sue upon cancellation of an
order, 3 and all the firms comprising the 10% usually follow a different prac-
tice. Of the total number of manufacturers, 69, who indicated that they are
most likely to pursue a particular course of action against a defaulting cus-
tomer, 30% always or usually take no action at all, 61% settle for expenses
incurred, and 9% insist upon a settlement of expenses plus lost profits.64 Since
61. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
62. The data in this paragraph are based on the responses to question 12 of the Ques-
tionnaire. See Appendix, page 1070 infra.
63. The group of 8 manufacturers comprising the 10% is distinguished only by its
complete heterogeneity. It represents seven industry groups and all four sizes as follows:
R, I; W, I; B, II; I, II; M, II; A, III; B, III; and E, IV. See QuEsTIoNNAIRS.
64. Seventy-eight firms responded to this question. However, the answers of 9 firms
did not reveal that any one course of conduct was more likely to be followed than one or
more of the other three. See QuESTIONNAIRES.
The distribution of responses for all 78 manufacturers is given by Table XVII below.
The average manufacturer settles for expenses incurred more than one-half of the time,
sometimes takes no action, seldom settles for expenses plus lost profits, and only rarely
sues. A breakdown by size groups shows remarkable consistency of practice for all sizes,
and therefore these figures are not reprinted here. See QUESTIONNAIRES.
i RESPONSE
ACTION TAKEN S
UPox, BREACH Always Usually Sometimes Never
Sue 0 0 8 70
Settle for
Expenses Incurred 15 27 14 22
Settle for Expenses
Plus Lost Profits 0 6 21 51
Take No Action [ 7 14 15 42
TABLE XVII
Course of Conduct Followed by 78 Manufacturers
upon Cancellation of an Order by a Customer after
Production has Commenced
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almost all of the manufacturers never resort to litigation as a method of re-
solving their disputes, and since all but a handful usually either seek no com-
pensation at all or are satisfied to settle for less than their legal right of re-
covery, the legal enforceability of the promises of the parties with whom they
deal apparently means little to them. 65 Accordingly, if oral promises were
made enforceable, the additional legal rights bestowed upon a manufacturer
who receives such promises would most likely be unexercised ;O6 but, if the
status quo is retained, the same manufacturer gains from the fact that his
suppliers and customers are barred from suing him on his own oral promises.
Moreover, the manufacturer is protected from possible suits predicated on
alleged oral promises which he has never made.
The same reasoning would explain the desire of the majority of manufac-
turers to terminate the legal enforceability of a class of promises presently
binding-where only the party being sued has signed documents relating to
the agreement. If the manufacturer's promisor is the party who alone has
signed a document, the law will not be utilized as an offensive weapon by the
manufacturer in the event of a breach, even though he has legal rights which
the courts would recognize. And in the situation where the manufacturer is
the only party who has signed a memorandum of the agreement, he will not
want the party with whom he deals to have access to the courts, especially
since he himself would have no legal rights on the same agreement in the case
of a breach by his promisor.
SHOULD THE STATUTE OF FiArDs BE RETAINED?
The complex of data concerning the action which manufacturers take in the
event a customer cancels his order throws new light on one important aspect
of the controversy involving the Statute of Frauds-whether it fosters or pre-
vents fraud.6 7 When a party to a business transaction breaches his agreement,
his resort to the Statute to escape his duty of providing compensation might
be considered fraud. However, consideration of actual business practice in
such circumstances indicates that even where a defendant has admittedly failed
to live up to the terms of his promise, his subsequent reliance on the Statute
as a defense may be justifiable. Thus, if the litigating parties have had exten-
65. The usual measure of damages for breach of contract is expenses incurred plus
lost profits. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 329, comment b (1932).
It might be thought that the enforceability of a customer's promise dictates the amount
which a manufacturer will receive from his customer upon the latter's cancellation of an
order. Cross-analysis of the data previously reported shows this not to be so. While 70
manufacturers usually or always obtain enforceable promises from their customers, see
note 14 supra, only 6 of the 70 usually or always insist on their legal measure of recovery.
66. Numerous comments were addressed to the question of whether the manufacturer
would sue upon breach. Perhaps the manufacturer's adverse attitude towards litigation is
best expressed in the words of one medium-size (100-500) fabricated metals manufac-
turer: "So far, we have been quite successful in avoiding law suits, and believe other
methods of adjustment are much more effective-and leave a better taste." QUESTION-
NAIRE.
67, See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text.
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sive prior dealings, and the plaintiff's known practice is to take no action upon
default by his promisors, a forcible argument can be made that insistence on
legal rights in this case is in violation of the defendant's legitimate expecta-
tions. And the same argument would apply if the plaintiff's known practice
is to settle for expenses incurred only, and the defendant is willing to afford
him this measure of settlement.6 s Because of the role of past practices, it is
clear that no generalization can be made as to whether the existence of the
Statute tends to facilitate or prohibit unfair conduct. Therefore, in evaluating
the desirability of the Statute for the modern business world, factors other
than the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of its original purpose of preventing
fraud must be considered.
The formal requirements for legal enforceability of business agreements
should accord with the prevailing practice and attitude of the business com-
munity.0 9 It may be contended that gearing enforceability to the observance
of formalities in business transactions, despite a contrary practice and attitude,
is justified, since the law should be utilized to encourage a manner of business
dealing which, though not presently followed, the legislature deems preferable.
Yet, if the businessmen who participate in these transactions choose, in the
exercise of their business judgment, to follow a different pattern of dealing
with each other, the law applicable to private disputes should not become an
instrument of forcing compliance with the conflicting opinion of another seg-
ment of the community regarding the manner in which business should be
conducted. 70 Accordingly, if business practice uniformly complies with the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, and if businessmen unanimously agree
that the Statute should be retained, any argument for repeal of the Statute as
68. The fundamental purpose of the law of contracts is usually said to be protection
of those expectations which have been aroused by the agreement of the parties. See 1
CORnIN, CONTRACTS § 1 (1950); G~ismoRE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1
(1947). An established pattern of settling would clearly seem to give rise to an expecta-
tion as to what will occur upon breach.
69. See, e.g., CARozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 61-64 (1921) (approv-
ing the expansion of law to meet the wants of trade through adopting trade customs as
the norm of the law) ; 1 CORBN, CONTRACTS § 1 (1950) (law, to be just, must be an ex-
pression of normal conduct); Corbin, The Uniform Conmercial Code--Sales; Should
It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 822-24 (1950) (depicting the development of commer-
cial law si'ice the time of Lord Mansfield as necessarily an accommodation to business
usages and customs) ; Stephen & Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds,
1 L.Q. REv. 1, 6-7 (1885).
70. Freedom of contract, a basic principle of Anglo-American contract law, is fre-
quently limited by the law in the name of overriding public policy. KEssLER & SHARP,
CONTRACTS 36-38 (1953) ; Willis, Contracts: A Law of Rights, Powers, Prizileges and
Immunities, 27 IND. L.J. 182, 195-96 (1952). Such limitations may be justified when they
attempt to discourage the making of contracts which are illegal, immoral, or otherwise
in conflict with the interests of the larger community. However, the only interests pro-
tected by requiring compliance with the formalities of contract law are those of the con-
tracting parties themselves. Thus, the formalities required for legal enforceability of busi-
ness agreements should be those which reflect the standards of the group affected-the
business community engaged in contracting activities.
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it affects business transactions is effectively countered. On the other hand,
if the business community ignores the requirements of the Statute in its day-
to-day dealings and disapproves of the legal disabilities which it creates, the
present worth of the Statute may be severely questioned. Since the responses
to the Questionnaire indicate the extent to which business promises actually
satisfy the demands of the Statute, as well as the attitude of businessmen toward
retention of the legislation, they are valuable data in evaluating the desirability
of the Statute for the modern business world.
Business practice usually complies with the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. 71 The average manufacturer ordinarily reduces his own commitments
to writing and receives written promises from the parties with whom he deals.
But manufacturers' transactions probably are characterized by signed memo-
randa because the parties deem it sound business practice to have written
records, and not because they are concerned with the legal enforceability of
their promisors' obligations under the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion is
bolstered by the findings that 1) 90% of the manufacturers never turn to the
courts in the event of a breach ;72 2) the manufacturers' practice of obtaining
written records is not changed for orders of special goods or for orders below
the value of $500, even though the customer can be legally held to such orders
in the absence of a signed memorandum ;73 3) even those manufacturers who
request written memoranda from their customers are frequently willing to
commence production on the basis of an unenforceable oral order, thus sacri-
ficing the certainty of a legally binding promise for business expediency ;74 4)
most manufacturers are willing to rely on an oral acceptance of their revision
of an order, even though the customer is not legally obligated to accept goods
conforming to the revised terms ;75 and 5) the manufacturer is frequently satis-
fied with an oral acknowledgment from a supplier, and does not request a
written acknowledgment to ensure the existence of legal rights in case the sup-
plier fails to deliver.76
Thus, it seems proper to conclude that business practice would not be
modified if the Statute of Frauds were repealed and oral promises were made
legally binding. The businessman would still want written records irrespective
of their legal value; for the reduction of commitments and agreements to writ-
ing contributes to a smoother working business organization and eliminates
the uncertainties and confusion which may accompany agreements involving
only the spoken word. Accordingly, the only effect which repeal of the Statute
of Frauds would have for the business community would be to allow an addi-
tional, and limited, class of promisees access to the courts in the event of a
breach.
71. See notes 11-16 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
74. See text at note 39 supra; note 40 supra.
75. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
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The majority of businessmen answering the Questionnaire does not believe
that this class of promisees should have legal rights, especially when the poten-
tial plaintiff has not performed in reliance upon the oral promise. Eighty-eight
per cent of the manufacturers expressed the opinion that the law should not
enforce an oral promise if the suing party has not performed. 77 The explana-
tion for this aversion to the intervention of the law may be found in the nature
of the business transaction which is marked by an oral promise. Since business-
men usually give and obtain promises evidenced by signed memoranda, a trans-
action not following this pattern obviously constitutes an exception to standard
business practice. And the fact that many manufacturers will not insist upon
written confirmation of an oral order if the customer is known to them, and
known to be reliable, 78 indicates that the promisee will make this exception, if
at all, when dealing on a personal, informal basis with a party with whom he
has regularly carried on business. This conclusion is also supported by the
greater prevalence of oral promises in the transactions of small manufacturers
than in those of large ones,79 for the opportunities of the small manufacturer
to do business under such conditions that the contracting parties will gain
personal knowledge of each other are of course far greater. Businessmen who
have dealt informally for a considerable period of time may not feel the need
to possess documents signed by the obligated party or to have the latter's oral
promise legally enforceable. And if the parties do want the law to supervise
their transactions, it seems fair to assume that they will reduce their respective
commitments to writing. For only 12% of the manufacturers never require a
written confirmation of their customer's oral orders,80 thus indicating that an
overwhelming majority of the manufacturers will request a signed memoran-
dum at least in those cases where they desire legal protection. Under these
circumstances, it seems doubtful whether any interest would be served by mak-
ing oral promises legally enforceable, especially when there has been no action
in reliance. The parties do not want such a law, and there is no reason why
it should be forced upon them.
If, however, a businessman has actually relied upon an oral order by com-
mencing production, other factors may come into play. While only 12% of the
manufacturers responding want an oral promise legally binding if the suing
party has not acted in reliance, almost half of the manufacturers (47%) believe
that the law should enforce an oral promise accompanied by performance.8'
The greater enthusiasm of the manufacturers for having the latter class of
promises enforceable, as well as the unwillingness of 53% of the manufacturers
to have the law enforce any oral promise, may be better understood by con-
sidering the situations in which an oral order may be cancelled after production
has begun. Such a cancellation might be made by a customer who is dealing
77. See text at notes 50-53 supra.
78. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
80. See Table XIV, note 31 supra.
81. See note 54 supra.
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on a personal, informal basis with the manufacturer, the parties not having
insisted upon any signed memoranda relating to the transaction. Under these
circumstances, a strong argument can be made that the manufacturer should
have no legal rights notwithstanding his reliance upon the oral order, since the
parties, by waiving the written documents which usually accompany business
transactions, have manifested an intention that their dealings be immune from
legal regulation. However, such a result may be harsh for the manufacturer.8 2
It is arguable that, to achieve an equitable balance, the manufacturer should
be permitted to recover reliance damages but not expectation damages. Thus,
he should not be entitled to any compensation for lost profits but should be
allowed to recoup any out-of-pocket expenditure which he has made in reliance
upon the order and which is now wasted. Since the manufacturer has chosen
to rely essentially upon non-legal sanctions, the damages recoverable from a
recalcitrant customer should not exceed that sum which he had a right to ex-
pect under the prevailing business practice of settling for expenses alone upon
cancellation of an order.
In order to enable the manufacturer to recover such an amount, it would
not be necessary to amend the Statute of Frauds. For the Statute will not bar
enforcement of a customer's oral promise if the requested goods are to be
made specially to the buyer's order.8 3 And the situation in which the manu-
facturer will incur an out-of-pocket expense which cannot be otherwise re-
couped will be the case where the customer cancels an oral order for special
goods the production of which has already commenced. If the cancelled order
is for stock items, the manufacturer will ordinarily incur no wasted expendi-
ture, since he can sell the goods he has started to produce to another buyer.
However, while the "special goods" exception to the Statute of Frauds serves
a commendable function in this context, it goes too far in automatically allow-
ing the manufacturer who is dealing informally with his customer to obtain
lost profits as well as expenses in the event that an oral order for special
goods is cancelled. The ideal solution would disallow recovery of lost profits
where the plaintiff's custom was to rely solely upon the oral promise of the
buyer.
On the other hand, situations may arise in which a businessman, though
dealing on an impersonal basis and in accordance with the usual practices of
the business community, will be faced with the task of enforcing an oral
promise on which he has relied. Most manufacturers feel it generally sound
82. The extent to which the ground of "unconscionable injury" may presently be
utilized to avoid the bar of the Statute of Frauds in an ordinary business transaction is
not clear from the case law. Compare Holton v. Reed, 193 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951),
with Booth v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 21 Cal. App. 427, 131 Pac. 1062 (1913). Where
the transaction is not in the ordinary course of business, courts have been more prone to
rely on such equitable considerations. See Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir.
1953) ; Berkey v. Halm, 101 Cal. App. 2d 62, 224 P.2d 885 (1950).
83. See UNIFORM SALES AcT § 4(2). The "special goods" exception can be utilized




business practice to commence production solely on the basis of an oral pur-
chase order, even though a forthcoming confirmation with the customer's
signature is expected or required. 4 If a manufacturer follows this practice,
and the customer cancels an oral order prior to sending his signed confirma-
tion, the manufacturer's legal rights will depend upon the enforceability of an
oral promise upon which the promisee, by performing, has relied. Unlike those
transactions in which the parties have chosen to deal with each other on an in-
formal basis, the manufacturer in this situation followed prevailing business
practice and expected to obtain a legally enforceable promise from his cus-
tomer. If the law does not enforce the customer's oral commitment under these
circumstances, it forces businessmen to make a choice between enjoying a
legally secure position and adhering to a method of dealing which the business
community usually follows and considers sound practice. But the law should
not force a party to abandon such practice as the price of obtaining legal pro-
tection. Therefore, where a seller performs in reliance upon an oral order for
goods, and it can be shown, either by reference to the past dealings of the
parties 15 or by the parties' actions in the case in question, that the seller reason-
ably expected a signed memorandum to be forthcoming, the law should enforce
the oral promise as though it were in writing.
In addition to indicating whether business practices and desires pointed
toward repeal of all or part of the Statute of Frauds, the responses also raised
the issue whether the Statute should be amended to make some promises un-
enforceable which are legally binding under present law. Fifty-six per cent of
the manufacturers feel that a promise evidenced by a signed memorandum
which has not evoked performance should not be enforceable unless the
promisee has also signed documents relating to the transaction. Such a case
could arise where a manufacturer sued a customer for cancelling a written
order which had been acknowledged orally, or where a manufacturer who
acknowledged an oral order in writing was sued by his customer for non-
delivery of the goods. However, since 44% of the manufacturers would approve
the victory which present law affords the plaintiff in these cases, it cannot be
said that the desires of the group as a whole would be served by tightening the
Statute. If actual business practices are considered, the Questionnaire data
reveal that only 1 of 87 manufacturers usually acknowledges written orders
orally.87 The infrequency of such oral acknowledgments provides some basis
for arguing that the Statute of Frauds should be amended to deny recovery
to the manufacturer-promisee who departs from the well-established business
norm of acknowledging written orders in writing. It may be contended that
84. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
85. Past practices of the parties may not be decisive of their rights under existing law.
See, e.g., Ackerman-Beardsley-Beninett, Inc. v. Baker, 19 Conn. Supp. 205, 111. A2d 17
(C.P. 1954) ; Continental Nut Co. v. Slate, 97 Cal. App. 2d 264, 217 P.2d 673 (1950).
86. See note 54 supra.
87. These data are based on the responses to question 10 of the Questionnaire. See
Appendix, page 1070 infra.
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such an amendment cannot be conceptually rationalized as an attempt to pre-
vent fraud, since the promisor will have signed a written memorandum of the
promise upon which he is being sued. However, while this memorandum would
establish that the order had been made, fraud would still be possible on the
question whether the order was ever orally accepted prior to cancellation and
thus gave rise to a contract. In the case of written acknowledgments of oral
orders, the responses to the Questionnaire reveal that 647 of the manufac-
turers usually follow this practice.8 8 In view of the frequency of this pattern
of dealing, the Statute of Frauds should not be amended to eliminate the rights
which customers receiving written acknowledgments presently enjoy.
88. This percentage represents 54 of the 84 manufacturers who responded to question
9 of the Questionnaire. See Appendix, page 1070 infra.
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE
For each question, please check the answer or answers which best describe the practice
and experience of your firm or that represent your best estimate of the course you would
follow under the conditions suggested. Please disregard transactions with controlled sub-
sidiaries of your firm, and, if your firm is a controlled subsidiary, please disregard trans-
actions with your parent company. Please feel free to make any additional comments on
the back of the last page.
1. Your firm employs:
Less than 25 persons
25 to 100 persons
100 to 500 persons
More than 500 persons
SFLLING PRACTUcES
2. Orders for your product are obtained by:
Solicitation by salesmen Competitive bids
Unsolicited inquiries Other (please specify)
Orders from catalogs
3. If the initial order is taken by a salesman, will he transmit it:
Always Usually Sometimes Never
By telephone or other word of mouth
By telegram
By mail with customer's signature or
stamp
By mail without customer's signature
or stamp
4. If the initial order comes directly from your purchaser to your office, will it be:
Always Usually Sometimes Never
By telephone or other word of mouth
By telegram
By mail
5. If the initial order is not in writing or is not signed by your customer, do you request
written confirmation of the order?
Always Usually Sometimes Never
If Usually or Sometimes, when?
6. When you receive an order by word of mouth, will you ever begin production before
you or your salesman receives a written confirmation of that order from your pur-
chaser? Yes -No
I
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7. If your answer to the previous question was yes, do you follow this practice when
dealing with a customer:
With whom you have had only
occasional dealings
With whom you have had no prior
dealings
Whose credit rating is poor
Who does not express an urgent need
for the goods







8. If your answer to question 6 was yes, is it more usual to begin production without a
written order on stock items than on goods made to special order?
More usual Less usual - No difference
9. How do you acknowledge or confirm oral (including telephone) orders:





By shipment only I
10. How do you acknowledge or confirm written orders:






11. If, for any reason, you cannot fill a written order exactly as received, would you
start work on the revised order or make shipment:
Always Usually Sometimes Never
Before notifying the customer of the
change
When oral agreement is reached on
the change
Upon receipt of a written confirmation I [
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12. If a purchaser cancels an order after you have commenced production, is it your
practice to:
Always Usually Sometimes Never
Sue
Settle for expenses incurred




13. When you initially place an order for materials or supplies with a supplier, do you
communicate this order:





14. Do you later confirm your telephone or other oral orders (if any) in writing?
Always - Usually - Sometimes -- Never
15. When you have placed an order with one of your suppliers, how will he confirm the
order?





16. If the supplier's initial confirmation of the order is not in writing, would you request
written confirmation?
Always - Usually - Sometimes - Never
17. Please check as many of the following transactions as you think the law should
enforce:
Where both parties have signed documents relating to an order
Where only the party being sued has signed documents relating to an order
Where neither party has signed documents relating to an order, but the suing
party has performed
Where neither party has signed documents relating to an order, and the suing
party has not performed
______ I ________ __________ ______
